Hong Kong - Age of Digital Convergence Conference

On June 12-13, I participated in the Age of Digital Convergence conference organized by Peter Yu in conjunction with, and hosted by, Hong Kong University. My talk was on "Copyright and the Role of Machines in Cultural Production." I briefly look at issues concerning the roles of machines as reading tools and authoring tools. Machines as readers has greater impact on copyright practices than on the interpretation of copyright law as such.

As a matter of practice, copyright owners are, or should be, increasingly aware of machines as the immediate audience for their works. These machines may be acting as discoverers, filters, organizers, translators, etc. Machines need rules to perform these functions, and digital works need to be marked up or formatted consistently with the rules used by these machines. In the open access context, the big lost opportunity is that most scholarship is not being published in a manner that enables machines readers to fully assist researchers.


Machines as authoring tools raise a host of interesting legal questions. I use the case of David Cope as an example. His Experiments in Musical Intelligence software composes music in the style of famous classical composers. WNYC has a nice interview with him, in which he explains how EMI works and the kinds of reactions he receives when audiences who find themselves emotionally moved by live performance of the composition learn that it is the produce of Cope's algorithm.



According to Cope:

Ultimately, the computer is just a tool with which we extend our minds. The music our algorithms compose are (sic) as much ours as the music created by the greatest of our personal human inspirations.

Well, "ours" in what sense? As a matter of copyright law, it is not at all clear that Cope is the legal author of the music that results from the operation of his software. There are four choices concerning copyright ownership of the outputs of an authoring tool:

(1) designer of tool
(2) user of tool
(3) joint ownership between designer and user
(4) no ownership

Tool designers can influence the outcome by running multiple permutations and fixing these in a tangible medium (digital storage).

Playing for Change

I just bought the Playing for Change CD/DVD. What a joy! While the Stand By Me video has received a lot of attention, the other songs and videos are as inspiring.

Intellectual Property and Price Discrimination - iTunes

There's a lot of debate about whether allowing or encouraging price discrimination - charging different people or classes of people a different price for the same good - is good policy with respect to goods that embody copyrighted works of authorship or patented inventions. The general population seems to have different reactions to different kinds of price discrimination schemes. On the one hand, most people don't seem to have a problem with senior citizen discounts at movie theaters, even though some seniors are quite wealthy. But, if Amazon chooses to customize the price of DVDs for each consumer, an uproar ensues.

I am very interested to see what happens with the recent deal between Apple and the recording companies to allow variable pricing on music files distributed by iTunes. This may or not be price discrimination depending on whether the good is "music" or particular songs because everyone will still pay the same price for particular songs.

Here, I just want to make two related theoretical points about the way that economists and legal scholars who use economic models talk about price discrimination.

Point 1. Most economic or law-and-economic analysts who talk about price discrimination say that the policy goal is to maximize people's welfare. I'm at the Penn Law Review symposium on the Foundations of Intellectual Property, and just watched Christopher Yoo make this point about his paper with John Conley on intellectual property and impure public goods.

For these analysts, whether price discrimination is good or bad for society depends on who wins and loses and by how much. But they model this trade off using people's willingness to pay for intellectual property goods as a signal for how much having a copy of a song or book or movie is going to improve their welfare. And these models get pretty complicated quickly, but they all are built on this foundation.

The problem is the gap between ability-to-pay and willingness-to-pay. If you care about welfare, ability-to-pay is a poor proxy for utility or welfare because the marginal value of a dollar depends on how many dollars you have. When iTunes charged you 99 cents a song, how does a consumer decide when it is worth paying that price? Imagine two people who value owning a legal copy of a particular song exactly the same, but one is wealthy and the other is struggling. At certain values, the wealthy person buys the song and the struggling person won't even though they both would get exactly the same amount of pleasure from the song because the relative cost to each person is quite different. So their respective decisions to buy or not are not really telling you how much they value owning a copy of the song.

So, in my view, analysts need to defend the proposition that their models tell us something about the effect of variable pricing on people's welfare when they have not accounted for the gap between wealth and welfare in the model. (Of course, this is a more general point about neoclassical economics, but it has particular salience in this context.)

Point 2. Those who have a reflexive antagonism to price discrimination need to be careful about form and substance. Some folks who have this reflex are reacting to the underlying market power that gives a seller the ability to engage in variable pricing without losing all of its customers to a competitor. I agree that market power is something to watch.

But firms with market power also engage in uniform pricing, as Apple has done with iTunes. In such a case, uniform pricing functions as a form of value discrimination or cost discrimination. Because the marginal value of a dollar varies across people, the price may be the same, but the relative cost of the song from the buyer's perspective varies. So if you want greater equality in the market place, you may actually want to encourage variable pricing if it has the economic effect of equalizing relative cost. I agree that this is very difficult to do in practice, but remember this is a theoretical point. In practice, though, this point about variable cost is what progressive taxation is all about.

So, if copyright is a tax on readers, should it be a progressive tax?

Can You CC License Music and Still Make Money?

Yes. Nine Inch Nail's Ghosts I-IV was released under a CC license and was the best selling album in 2008 on Amazon's MP3 store. As Fred Benenson writes on the Creative Commons blog:

NIN’s Creative Commons licensed Ghosts I-IV has been making lots of headlines these days.

First, there’s the critical acclaim and two Grammy nominations, which testify to the work’s strength as a musical piece. But what has got us really excited is how well the album has done with music fans. Aside from generating over $1.6 million in revenue for NIN in its first week, and hitting #1 on Billboard’s Electronic charts, Last.fm has the album ranked as the 4th-most-listened to album of the year, with over 5,222,525 scrobbles.

Even more exciting, however, is that Ghosts I-IV is ranked the best selling MP3 album of 2008 on Amazon’s MP3 store.

Take a moment and think about that.

NIN fans could have gone to any file sharing network to download the entire CC-BY-NC-SA album legally. Many did, and thousands will continue to do so. So why would fans bother buying files that were identical to the ones on the file sharing networks? One explanation is the convenience and ease of use of NIN and Amazon’s MP3 stores. But another is that fans understood that purchasing MP3s would directly support the music and career of a musician they liked.

The next time someone tries to convince you that releasing music under CC will cannibalize digital sales, remember that Ghosts I-IV broke that rule, and point them here.

Politics and Popular Music

As seems to happen during every federal election campaign season, we're seeing a new round of controversies emerge as politicians seek to harness popular music for their own purposes.

There are two kinds of controversies. One involves public performance at rallies and other campaign events. Usually, these performances are licensed under a collective license issued by ASCAP and BMI. The recent complaint issued by Heart against the McCain-Palin campaign for use of the song "Barracuda" falls into this category.

The second involves synchronizing music for use in viral videos on video-sharing sites. Warner Music issued a take-down notice to YouTube for a McCain ad that used Franki Valli's "Can't Take My Eyes Off of You". In these disputes, the use is not licensed and is therefore infringing unless it is a fair use.

Query whether, from a free speech perspective, it is appropriate to let the copyright license status cause these cases to be treated differently? The answer would be yes if the artists' or copyright owner's interests were primarily economic. However, because the concern about implied endorsement is heightened in the campaign setting, should the artist's or copyright owner's interest in being free from an unwanted association be given greater weight while also acknowledging the campaign's desire to use popular culture as a means of connecting with voters?

So as a trial balloon I'm wondering whether copyright law and trademark law ought not be interpreted to yield a result under which campaigns should be free to use popular music at rallies and in connection with promotional videos so long as they prominently disclaim any implied endorsement from the songwriters or performers, regardless of whether such use is covered by a collective license.

I have some reservations about this particular solution, but it seems to me that we need a resolution to this recurring conflict that is medium-neutral and that targets the relevant expressive and economic interests on both sides.

The Rule of Law and Copyright's Distribution Right

As Bill Patry reports, District Judge Michael Davis has asked for briefing on whether he must order a new trial in the best-known P2P copyright infringement case against an individual. The reason is that Judge Davis is properly concerned that he committed legal error by accepting the RIAA's proposed jury instruction that equates the copyright owner's right of public distribution with a right of merely making copies available for distribution or reproduction.

Although it won't, the RIAA should welcome this development because the RIAA's effort to misconstrue the distribution right is another example of "be careful what you wish for."

If courts take the RIAA's argument seriously, which some have, then you or I have the right to download a DRM-free music file from Amazon or Apple or Napster or . . . and share that file with anyone over a P2P service. Huh? How can this be, you ask.

Well, if you, I, or a federal court, takes the language of the Copyright Act seriously, as we should, and if the RIAA's reading of that language were right, then it would work like this. Copyright automatically gives the owner a set of five exclusive rights, with some exceptions for certains types of works: (1) reproduction; (2) distribution; (3) public performance; (4) public display; and (5) adaptation (i.e. the right to prepare derivative works).

In a series of cases against users of peer-to-peer services, the RIAA has argued that to prove infringement of the distribution right, the owner does not need to prove whether any music files in a user's shared directory were copied or when they were copied because merely putting the file in such a directory and connecting to the Internet is enough to violate the exclusive right of public distribution.

The industry has a number of reasons for making this argument, one of which is that the argument makes it much cheaper to prove the industry's many infringement cases against individuals. But most of Section 106 of the Copyright Act was written without digital technology in mind, and courts have to apply the law as Congress has enacted it. If changed circumstances mean that the statute doesn't work the way it once did, courts can use the flexibility inherent in language to adapt the law, but at some point that flexibility is exhausted. If you think the law no longer works, you have to go back to Congress.

In my view, circumstances have changed so that the law no longer works the way it once did, but the reproduction right under the Copyright Act still gives music copyright owners sufficient protection without needing to turn the distribution right into a separate "making available" right. The RIAA is, of course, free to take a different view, but it has to persuade Congress that it's right. Persuading Congress to change the law is expensive and time consuming, and so industry would rather that courts simply give it this new right through creative statutory interpretation.

This kind of expedient thinking is deeply problematic. The RIAA routinely excoriates users of peer-to-peer services for failing to respect the rule of law. But the RIAA's "making available" argument is so at odds with the language of the Copyright Act that it calls the industry's own respect for the rule of law into question. Here's why.

The Copyright Act created separate rights of reproduction and distribution so that the copyright owner could go after the different links in the supply chain of an infringing enterprise. In the days of vinyl, the folks who manufactured bootlegs and unauthorized copies were not always the sellers on the street. So the reproduction right gives the basis for suing the manufacturer and the distribution right provides the basis for going after the retailer.

Specifically, Section 106(3) gives the copyright owner the exclusive right "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending." This language breaks down into three elements that the copyright owner must prove to show infringement: (1) the transfer of "copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work" (2) "to the public" (3) "by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending."

There is no way that merely connecting to the Internet or to a peer-to-peer service with files stored in one's shared directory can be said to be a transfer of those files to the public. The RIAA's argument relies on some statutory sleight-of-hand by which it tries to substitute the definition of "publication" for the plain language of the distribution right in Section 106(3).

Although a few courts have accepted this argument, the tide is now running the other way. It'll be interesting to see how far it runs. If we really take the statute seriously, then, as I and others before me have argued (footnote 52), the truth is that the distribution right simply does not apply to file transfers over the Internet because such interactions are not the transfer of one copy from user A to user B but instead a reproduction of user A's copy for the benefit of user B.

But, let's accept for the sake of argument that making a file available on a peer-to-peer service is a distribution. Then we have to apply all the parts of the Copyright Act that govern distributions because Section 106 says that the exclusive rights it provides are given "[s]ubject to sections 107 through 122". That means the first sale doctrine applies.

When it comes to the copyright owner's exclusive right to distribute copies, the copyright owner gets one bite at the apple. Make your money on the first sale of a copy. Once the user has purchased that copy, the distribution right is exhausted. So, even though a purchaser's resale of that copy to a used record store is technically a distribution of the copyrighted work, Section 109 of the Copyright Act says that the purchaser "is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord."

So, here's where the DRM-free download comes in. If you or I purchase a copy (technically a digital phonorecord) of an mp3 file and store it in our shared directory, then the first sale doctrine applies to that file. And if making it available to others on a peer-to-peer service is a distribution, then under Section 109, you or I could legally distribute that copy to whoever wants it.

The RIAA would first say, ah, but you didn't actually purchase that copy. You only have a license to it. That theory, however, is going bust, as it did in the recent Vernor case.

The RIAA would then say, "no, no, no, you're not distributing that copy. You're letting others make their own copies."

Q.E.D.

Radiohead and Pay What You Will

Radiohead has made an interesting move by releasing its new album on a pay-what-you-will basis. In an article I started drafting in 2000, I suggested that musicians can succeed under this model so long as purchasers think of the transaction as a show of support. Whether characterized as the "warm glow" of do-gooder consumption or as a refletion of the restitutionary impulse that Wendy Gordon argues is at the base of copyright law, it is not surprising that people are paying for something they can download for free.

The risk in this model is that the frame of the transaction depends on perceptions and norms. If the frame switches to that of neoclassical economics, in which consumers and producers are adverse parties competing for a larger share of surplus, then the model fails. Stephen King seemed to think his experiment along these lines was a failure, and if it was, it may be because he charged a specific price ($1) for each installment of his serialized novel.

Fencing Mozart In

A good news story for some classical music fans. A bad news story for champions of copyright's public domain. Digital copies of Mozart's scores are now "freely" available here. These works are in the public domain for copyright purposes, which means you are free to copy them without restriction.

However, the International Mozarteum Foundation, which has provided this service, has imposed a click-through agreement requiring visitors to agree to limit their use of the public domain to personal and fair use copies.

Digitizing copyright's public domain is to be applauded. Locking it behind contractual fences is not. There are other and better cost recovery models for this kind of transitional effort.